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1553 
THE HARMS OF RACIST ONLINE HATE SPEECH 
IN THE POST-COVID WORKING WORLD:  
EXPANDING EMPLOYEE PROTECTIONS 
Tatiana Hyman* 
 
In one year, the COVID-19 pandemic and egregious incidents of racial 
violence have created significant shifts in the United States’s workplace 
culture and social climate.  Many employers are transitioning employees to 
long-term or permanent remote work, and conversations about racial justice 
are more pervasive and divisive, especially on social media.  With people 
spending more time at home and on the internet, hate speech has increased 
and inspired global conversations about curtailing its harmful effects.  
Unlike many other countries, the United States does not penalize hate speech.  
Nevertheless, its harmful effects have reached the workplace, and employers 
have fired employees who posted offensive speech on their personal social 
media pages.  Penalizing racist or offensive social media posts is left to 
employers’ discretion, resulting in inconsistent court rulings.  More 
specifically, some courts have found conduct outside of the workplace and 
on social media to be actionable in workplace harassment claims while 
others have not.  This Note proposes that the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission should expand its guidelines to state that courts should consider 
racist hate speech on an employee’s personal social media page in the 
totality of the circumstances in Title VII hostile work environment claims. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“If Facebook were a country, it would have the largest population on 
earth.”1  The percentage of American adults using social media platforms has 
risen from 5 percent to over 70 percent in fifteen years.2  As one of the most 
popular online activities, social media3 has become a primary means of 
networking for individuals and marketing for businesses.4  Although social 
media has conferred several societal benefits, including connectivity, 
education, information sharing, and community building, it has also had 
significant negative effects on society, particularly through “online hate 
 
 1. Evan Osnos, Can Mark Zuckerberg Fix Facebook Before It Breaks Democracy?, NEW 
YORKER (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/17/can-mark-
zuckerberg-fix-facebook-before-it-breaks-democracy [https://perma.cc/7UEH-ZCBN]. 
 2. See J. Clement, Percentage of U.S. Population Who Currently Use Any Social Media 
from 2008 to 2019, STATISTA (May 19, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/273476/ 
percentage-of-us-population-with-a-social-network-profile [https://perma.cc/QYK4-R9Y4]; 
Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/ 
internet/fact-sheet/social-media [https://perma.cc/8DY6-836J]. 
 3. See Andreas Kaplan & Michael Haenlein, Users of the World, Unite!:  The Challenges 
and Opportunities of Social Media, 53 BUS. HORIZONS 59, 60 (2010) (defining social media 
as a general term that can be broken down into six categories:  collaborative projects, blogs, 
content communities, social networking sites, virtual game worlds, and virtual social worlds).  
For purposes of this Note, the term “social media” will refer to interactive social networking 
sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. 
 4. See Maya E. Dollarhide, Social Media Definition, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 6, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/social-media.asp [https://perma.cc/3V6Q-6WLW] 
(stating that “[s]ocial media originated as a way to interact with friends and family but was 
later adopted by businesses which wanted to take advantage of a popular new communication 
method to reach out to customers”). 
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speech”5 and harassment.6  In a nationally representative survey conducted 
in January 2020, 44 percent of respondents said that they experienced online 
harassment.7  Additionally, 25 percent of respondents who reported that they 
experienced online harassment said that the harassment focused on their 
ethnicity or race.8  Since the survey, online hate speech has increased due to 
the confluence of the COVID-19 pandemic and rising racial tensions across 
the nation.9 
During the COVID-19 outbreak, many employees transitioned to work 
from home to “flatten the curve” and comply with lockdown orders.10  Along 
with these transitions came an increase in videoconferencing on various 
platforms such as Zoom, Skype, and Microsoft Teams.11  Remote work 
created challenges for employees, including miscommunication, poor 
 
 5. See IGINIO GAGLIARDONE ET AL., COUNTERING ONLINE HATE SPEECH 10 (2015) 
(explaining that the definition of hate speech is complex but that hate speech generally “refers 
to expressions that advocate incitement to harm (particularly, discrimination, hostility or 
violence) based upon the target’s being identified with a certain social or demographic 
group”); see also Speech, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining hate speech as 
speech “whose sole purpose is to demean people on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, 
religion, age, disability, or some other similar ground, esp. when the communication is likely 
to provoke violence”).  This Note uses “social media hate speech,” “online hate speech,” “hate 
speech,” and “racist speech” to refer broadly to speech conveyed through text or images that 
is offensive, derogatory, and fuels discrimination, hostility, or violence toward people because 
of their race. 
 6. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, ONLINE HATE AND HARASSMENT:  THE AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE 2020, at 17 (2020), https://www.adl.org/media/14643/download 
[https://perma.cc/S4BM-MDBQ].  See generally Waseem Akram, A Study on Positive and 
Negative Effects of Social Media on Society, INT’L J. COMPUT. SCI. & ENG’G, Oct. 2017, at 347. 
 7. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 6, at 7. 
 8. Id. at 11. 
 9. See U.N. Secretariat, United Nations Guidance Note on Addressing and Countering 
COVID-19 Related Hate Speech, at 2 (May 11, 2020), https://digitallibrary.un.org/ 
record/3863213?ln=en [https://perma.cc/67ZF-DYNP] (stating that the pandemic has brought 
an increase in hate speech and discrimination and that “COVID-19 related hate speech” is 
being spread through social media and other platforms); see also Sara Fischer, Hate Speech 
Has Soared Online Since George Floyd’s Death, AXIOS (July 21, 2020), 
https://www.axios.com/hate-speech-online-soars-after-george-floyds-death-463871bb-dfe4-
4b0c-becc-e59cdcfb6336.html [https://perma.cc/AE5R-HA3X]; Craig Timberg & Allyson 
Chiu, As the Coronavirus Spreads, So Does Online Racism Targeting Asians, New Research 
Shows, WASH. POST (April 8, 2020, 5:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
technology/2020/04/08/coronavirus-spreads-so-does-online-racism-targeting-asians-new-
research-shows [https://perma.cc/MB92-THBE]. 
 10. See Rita Zeidner, Coronavirus Makes Work from Home the New Normal, SHRM 
(Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/all-things-work/pages/remote-work-
has-become-the-new-normal.aspx [https://perma.cc/RZ3G-XHMK]. 
 11. See Bob O’Donnell, Zoom, the Office and the Future:  What Will Work Look Like 
After Coronavirus?, USA TODAY (Sept. 7, 2020, 12:42 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/tech/columnist/2020/09/07/zoom-work-from-home-future-office-after-
coronavirus/5680284002 [https://perma.cc/MM4A-LSX2]. 
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collaboration, isolation,12 and “Zoom fatigue.”13  Despite these challenges, 
several employers plan to let employees work from home permanently even 
after the pandemic subsides.14  Thus, the increased usage of 
telecommunication is likely to remain, forever changing the workplace from 
one that employees largely experience in a brick-and-mortar building to one 
that many employees will experience completely online.15 
In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing transitions in the 
workplace, another sickness shook the nation.  On May 25, 2020, the police 
killing of George Floyd brought the realities of racial tension in America to 
the forefront of people’s hearts, minds, and social media timelines.16  As the 
hashtag #BlackLivesMatter17 brought more visibility to support for racial 
 
 12. See Working Remotely:  Careers, Management and Strategy, GALLUP, 
https://www.gallup.com/workplace/316313/understanding-and-managing-remote-
workers.aspx#ite-316508 [https://perma.cc/W3JK-AUHS] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 13. See Liz Fosslien & Mollie West Duffy, How to Combat Zoom Fatigue, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Apr. 29, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/04/how-to-combat-zoom-fatigue [https://perma.cc/ 
RQQ3-EZEQ]. 
 14. See Allana Akhtar, Dropbox Will Let All Employees Work from Home Permanently 
as It Turns Its Offices into WeWork-Like ‘Collaborative Spaces,’ BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 13, 2020, 
4:58 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/dropbox-letting-all-employees-work-from-
home-permanently-2020-10 [https://perma.cc/HR3N-7Z4M]; Uri Berliner, Get a 
Comfortable Chair:  Permanent Work from Home Is Coming, NPR (June 22, 2020, 12:26 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/22/870029658/get-a-comfortable-chair-permanent-work-from-
home-is-coming [https://perma.cc/EET3-9ERU]; Shannon Bond, Facebook Expects Half Its 
Employees to Work Remotely Permanently, NPR (May 21, 2020, 5:15 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/05/21/860382831/facebook-
expects-half-its-employees-to-work-remotely-forever [https://perma.cc/2VKT-FKM5]; Rob 
McLean, These Companies Plan to Make Working from Home the New Normal.  As in 
Forever, CNN (June 25, 2020, 6:57 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/22/tech/work-from-
home-companies/index.html [https://perma.cc/4WK4-XAE5]; Jennifer Surane, Synchrony to 
Let All U.S. Staff Work from Home Permanently, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2020, 9:06 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-20/synchrony-to-allow-u-s-employees-
to-work-from-home-permanently [https://perma.cc/5RXT-NM9F]. 
 15. See Katherine Guyot & Isabel V. Sawhill, Telecommuting Will Likely Continue Long 
After the Pandemic, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2020/04/06/telecommuting-will-likely-continue-long-after-the-pandemic 
[https://perma.cc/2N69-9JQ4]; Rani Molla, Office Work Will Never Be the Same, VOX (May 
21, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/5/21/21234242/coronavirus-COVID-
19-remote-work-from-home-office-reopening [https://perma.cc/RB3D-54UK] (stating that 
reliance on technology and workplace software like videoconferencing and chat applications 
will likely continue even after people return to the office). 
 16. See Monica Anderson et al., #BlackLivesMatter Surges on Twitter After George 
Floyd’s Death, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 10, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2020/06/10/blacklivesmatter-surges-on-twitter-after-george-floyds-death [https:// 
perma.cc/KWX2-33AQ]; Tyrone Beason, ‘Something Is Not Right.’  George Floyd Protests 
Push White Americans to Think About Their Privilege, L.A. TIMES (June 28, 2020, 6:00AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-06-28/white-voters-racism-reckoning-george-
floyd-killing [https://perma.cc/6F68-UA7W]; Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd Was Killed 
in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/ 
us/george-floyd-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/4T9Q-WZZK]. 
 17. #BlackLivesMatter is a movement that began in 2013 after a jury acquitted George 
Zimmerman of the murder of Trayvon Martin, an unarmed Black teenager. See About, BLACK 
LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about [https://perma.cc/2YVK-BGQB] (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2021); Aleem Maqbool, Black Lives Matter:  From Social Media Post to 
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justice18 and as nationwide protests intensified,19 online hate speech 
increased in response.20  The explosion of social media usage as people spent 
more time indoors and on their mobile devices because of the COVID-19 
lockdown21 further exacerbated the spread of hate speech. 
As hate speech intensified, social media companies faced pressure from 
civil rights groups and corporate advertisers to regulate hate speech on their 
platforms.22  Unlike many other countries,23 the United States does not 
regulate the dissemination of hate speech.24  Thus, the main restrictive 
measures against online hate speech are the policies that social media 
companies implement and the use of content moderation to remove posts that 
violate those policies.25  While social media companies have made some 
 
Global Movement, BBC (July 9, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-
53273381 [https://perma.cc/WUQ8-RJNR]. 
 18. See Anderson et al., supra note 16; Scottie Andrew, People Are Tweeting About Black 
Lives Matter Now More than at Any Point in the Movement’s History, CNN (June 11, 2020, 
3:35 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/11/us/black-lives-matter-hashtag-popularity-
trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/R3KU-W24R]. 
 19. See Derrick Bryson Taylor, George Floyd Protests:  A Timeline, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-protests-timeline.html [https:// 
perma.cc/289K-SDA4]. 
 20. See Fischer, supra note 9. 
 21. See Sarah Fischer, Social Media Use Spikes During Pandemic, AXIOS (Apr. 24, 2020), 
https://www.axios.com/social-media-overuse-spikes-in-coronavirus-pandemic-764b384d-
a0ee-4787-bd19-7e7297f6d6ec.html [https://perma.cc/33E4-Q5XW]; Ella Koeze & 
Nathaniel Popper, The Virus Changed the Way We Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/07/technology/coronavirus-internet-use.html 
[https://perma.cc/PDA5-8LFP]; Alexandra Samet, How the Coronavirus Is Changing US 
Social Media Usage, EMARKETER (July 29, 2020), https://www.emarketer.com/content/how-
coronavirus-changing-us-social-media-usage [https://perma.cc/VT89-9X7X] (stating that 
“[t]he Harris Poll conducted between late March and early May, found that between 46% and 
51% of US adults were using social media more since the outbreak began”). 
 22. See Claire Atkinson, Facebook Is Facing Its Biggest Backlash Yet, as Advertiser 
Boycott Gains Momentum, NBC NEWS (June 24, 2020, 3:59 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/facebook-faces-growing-pressure-
advertisers-do-more-counteract-hate-speech-n1231786 [https://perma.cc/ 
5L9J-WWPY] (describing a wave of companies that have joined together through the Stop 
Hate for Profit campaign to pull advertising from Facebook and put pressure on Facebook to 
improve the counteraction of hate speech); Civil Rights Groups Call for ‘Pause’ on Facebook 
Ads, U.S. NEWS (June 17, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/technology/articles/2020-06-
17/civil-rights-groups-call-for-pause-on-facebook-ads [https://perma.cc/K7RZ-UA3U]; 
George Floyd:  Ben & Jerry’s Joins Facebook Ad Boycott, BBC NEWS (June 24, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53146256 [https://perma.cc/U259-CA6T]; Barbara 
Ortutay & Tali Arbel, Social Media Platforms Face a Reckoning Over Hate Speech, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 29, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/ 
6d0b3359ee5379bd5624c9f1024a0eaf [https://perma.cc/9XB4-MWWW]. 
 23. Alexander Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace:  Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet, 38 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817, 858 (2001) (listing countries that prohibit the dissemination of hate 
speech, including Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cyprus, England, France, Germany, 
India, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland). 
 24. See Richard Stengel, Opinion, Why America Needs a Hate Speech Law, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 29, 2019, 8:20 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/10/29/why-
america-needs-hate-speech-law [https://perma.cc/KKZ7-S6VW]; infra Part I.D. 
 25. See Cogito Tech LLC, What Is Social Media Content Moderation and How 
Moderation Companies Use Various Techniques to Moderate Contents?, MEDIUM (May 11, 
2020), https://medium.com/cogitotech/what-is-social-media-content-moderation-and-how-
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efforts to curtail hate speech,26 people have criticized content moderation as 
inconsistent and harmful to human moderators.27  Furthermore, Congress has 
recently considered whether these existing measures are adequate to curtail 
online hate speech and its dangerous effects on society.28 
Only a short time after Floyd’s killing, the effects of the social unrest and 
social media hate speech reached the workplace.  Employers began to fire 
employees who posted racist or offensive comments on their personal social 
media pages.29  In the week following George Floyd’s killing, for example, 
the executive producer of Law & Order fired the TV show’s spin-off writer 
after he posted a picture of himself on Facebook holding a rifle and 
commenting that he would “light up” looters who tried to come near his 
property.30  In his remarks on Twitter, the executive producer stated, “I will 
not tolerate this conduct, especially during our hour of national grief.”31  His 
comments were met with both support and criticism.  One Twitter user stated, 
“[The spinoff writer] should not have been fired because of that statement 




 26. See Karissa Bell, Twitter Will Block Links Promoting Hate Speech and Violence, 
ENGADGET (July 28, 2020), https://www.engadget.com/twitter-bans-links-hateful-conduct-
violence-010623900.html [https://perma.cc/K2SS-WF7V]; Salvador Rodriguez, Zuckerberg:  
Facebook Will Prohibit Hate Speech in Its Ads, CNBC (June 26, 2020, 5:20 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/26/zuckerberg-facebook-will-prohibit-hate-speech-in-its-
ads.html [https://perma.cc/MJQ2-YE9R]. 
 27. See Andrew Arsht & Daniel Etcovitch, The Human Cost of Online Content 
Moderation, JOLT DIG. (Mar. 2, 2018), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/the-human-cost-of-
online-content-moderation [https://perma.cc/N823-Y2AL]; Jillian C. York & Corynne 
McSherry, Content Moderation Is Broken.  Let Us Count the Ways., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. 
(Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/04/content-moderation-broken-let-us-
count-ways [https://perma.cc/2M7Q-56WH]. 
 28. See infra notes 143–45 and accompanying text. 
 29. See, e.g., Andrew Dalton, People Are Getting Fired Over Racist, Violent, and 
Insensitive Social Media Posts, FORTUNE (June 4, 2020, 3:30 PM), https://fortune.com/2020/ 
06/04/racist-violent-social-media-firings-grant-napear-craig-gore [https://perma.cc/D3FH-
TJ4L]. 
 30. Sandra Gonzalez, ‘Law & Order’ Spinoff Fires Writer After He Appeared to Make 
Threatening Social Media Post, CNN (June 2, 2020, 10:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2020/06/02/entertainment/craig-gore/index.html [https://perma.cc/NP9S-QSXG]. 
 31. Wolf Entertainment (@WolfEnt), TWITTER (June 2, 2020, 2:31 PM), 
https://twitter.com/WolfEnt/status/1267886470670323714 [https://perma.cc/7WYP-Y7RG]. 
 32. Riley Scott (@rileypscott), TWITTER (June 2, 2020, 9:18 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
rileypscott/status/1267988912317882368 [https://perma.cc/WU8B-XMNJ]. 
 33. See, e.g., Will Thorne, ‘The Flash’ Star Hartley Sawyer Fired Over Racist, 
Misogynistic Tweets, VARIETY (June 8, 2020, 11:00 AM), https://variety.com/2020/tv/news/ 
the-flash-hartley-sawyer-fired-racist-tweets-1234627876 [https://perma.cc/WU8B-XMNJ]. 
 34. See, e.g., Noah Goldberg, MTA Aims to Fire Worker for Racist Social Media Post 
Targeting George Floyd Protesters, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 12, 2020, 12:07 PM), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ny-mta-fire-employee-george-floyd-protests-jason-
brown-racist-20200612-e3lao7wk4zgwppl2natqn3gzka-story.html [https://perma.cc/2TVV-
FDDC]; Katie Way, Cops Are Getting Fired Over Their Racist Social Media Posts, VICE (June 
11, 2020, 4:04 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/dyz7yz/cops-getting-fired-for-racist-
social-media-posts [https://perma.cc/VL72-YUQB]; see also Bennett v. Metro. Gov’t, 977 
F.3d 530, 538 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that a public employee’s social media posting with a 
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posting racist comments.  Although firings for racist speech occurred before 
the COVID-19 pandemic and the killing of George Floyd,35 this new wave 
of terminations garnered substantial criticism, including from former 
president Donald Trump.36 
The crux of the debate is this:  to what extent should employers have the 
right to fire employees for posts on their personal social media pages?  As it 
stands, restrictions on how an employer can respond to employees’ racist 
social media posts depend on whether the employer is private or public.  In 
every state except for Montana, private employment is at will, meaning an 
employee can be fired or can quit at any time and for any cause.37  Generally, 
the only restrictions on a private employer’s right to fire an employee are 
statutory protections under the National Labor Relations Act,38 the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,39and the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989.40 
On the other hand, the First Amendment41 protects the speech of public 
employees to a degree.42  When evaluating a public employee’s free speech 
claim, the U.S. Supreme Court balances an employee’s right to comment on 
matters of public concern with the state’s interest, as an employer, in 
efficiently providing services to the public.43  Recently, the Fourth Circuit 
 
racially charged comment on the outcome of the presidential election was not highly protected 
speech). 
 35. See, e.g., Venable v. Metro. Gov’t, 430 F. Supp. 3d 350, 353–55 (M.D. Tenn. 2019). 
 36. Trump commented that cancel culture is a “political weapon[] . . . driving people from 
their jobs.” Remarks at an Independence Day Celebration at the Mount Rushmore National 
Memorial in Keystone, South Dakota, 2020 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (July 3, 2020), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202000494/pdf/DCPD-202000494.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/6H4N-RRBP]; see also Moshe Z. Marvit & Shaun Richman, If “Cancel Culture” Is 
About Getting Fired, Let’s Cancel at-Will Employment, IN THESE TIMES (July 29, 2020), 
https://inthesetimes.com/article/cancel-culture-just-cause-union-labor-employment 
[https://perma.cc/PC4T-N688] (arguing that an employer’s right to fire at-will should be 
curbed by a just cause standard).  In an open letter signed by over 150 academics, J. K. 
Rowling and her fellow writers stated, “We need to preserve the possibility of good-faith 
disagreement without dire professional consequences.” A Letter on Justice and Open Debate, 
HARPER’S MAG. (July 7, 2020), https://harpers.org/a-letter-on-justice-and-open-debate 
[https://perma.cc/6NCH-R8LL]. 
 37. Lisa Guerin, Employment at Will:  What Does It Mean?, NOLO, 
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/employment-at-will-definition-30022.html 
[https://perma.cc/P2FN-ZJ6Q] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 38. 29 U.S.C. § 151–169.  The National Labor Relations Act prevents employers from 
limiting speech that is related to concerted activity. Id. § 157. 
 39. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.).  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from discharging an 
individual based on the individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 40. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 and 
22 U.S.C.).  The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 protects federal whistleblowers who 
work for the government and report the possible existence of an activity constituting a 
violation of law, rules, or regulations. Id. 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 42. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983) (stating that “a public employee does 
not relinquish First Amendment rights to comment on matters of public interest”). 
 43. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); see also Connick, 461 U.S. 
at 150 (stating that “[t]he Pickering balance requires full consideration of the government’s 
interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public”). 
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arrived at divergent holdings in cases involving public employees and the 
regulation of their speech on social media.44 
Regardless of this divergence between the rights of private and public 
employers to terminate employees for racist or offensive social media posts, 
all employers with at least fifteen employees are subject to workplace 
harassment claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.45  Under Title VII of 
the Act, employees can sue their employers for failing to prevent or correct 
harassment and, specifically, for conduct that creates a “hostile work 
environment.”46  However, Title VII and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission’s (EEOC) guidance on harassment do not specify whether 
employees may have recourse for content that coworkers post on their 
personal social media pages when the content creates a hostile work 
environment.  Although employers are expected to prevent and correct 
workplace harassment that occurs in the workplace, the extent of an 
employer’s responsibility to prevent and correct harassment that occurs on 
social media is less clear.  In light of the changing contours of the workplace 
and the growing recognition of the harms of hate speech, an evaluation of 
employers’ responsibility to prevent and correct employees’ racist online 
hate speech is necessary.47 
This Note considers how the EEOC can update its employment 
discrimination guidelines to protect employees from the effects of racist 
online hate speech that creates a hostile work environment.  Part I describes 
the development of the hostile work environment claim, the boundaries of 
employer liability, the tensions between sexual harassment and racial 
harassment jurisprudence, and the protections that social media companies 
have against hate speech.  Part II discusses courts’ responses to and debate 
regarding harassment outside of the workplace and on social media.  Finally, 
Part III proposes that the EEOC should expand its regulations to state that, in 
hostile work environment claims, courts may consider racist hate speech on 
employees’ personal social media pages in the totality of the circumstances. 
 
 44. Compare Grutzmacher v. Howard County, 851 F.3d 332, 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(holding that a county fire department did not violate an employee’s First Amendment rights 
upon discharging him for liking and positively replying to a “racially charged” comment made 
on a social media post because the employer’s interest in preventing workplace disruption 
outweighed the employee’s free speech interest), with Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 
F.3d 400, 408 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that a police department’s social media policy 
prohibiting the dissemination of any information “that would tend to discredit or reflect 
unfavorably upon the [Department]” violated a police officer’s First Amendment rights 
(alteration in original)). 
 45. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining employer as “a person engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees”). 
 46. Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/ 
harassment [https://perma.cc/JFX2-9AJ6] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021); see infra Part I.A. 
 47. See infra Part III. 
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I.  THE HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL MEDIA HATE SPEECH 
PROTECTIONS 
Hostile work environment jurisprudence has developed, primarily, 
through a series of cases involving claims of sexual harassment in the brick-
and-mortar workplace.48  This Note considers how the EEOC can bolster 
protections in the workplace against racial harassment and hate speech 
online. 
Part I discusses the legal background of the hostile work environment 
claim and describes how hate speech is regulated in the United States in 
contrast to other countries.  Part I.A describes the development of the hostile 
work environment jurisprudence through case law and EEOC regulation.  
Part I.B explains the different standards for employer liability in hostile work 
environment claims.  Part I.C highlights scholarship about racial harassment 
claims and how they should be assessed in light of the overriding 
jurisprudential and academic focus on sexual harassment.  Finally, Part I.D 
discusses the policies that social media companies have against hate speech, 
which are the primary protections against online hate speech in the United 
States.  Part I.D also highlights Congress’s recent considerations about 
expanding protections against hate speech. 
A.  Development of the Hostile Work Environment Claim 
The hostile work environment claim is a federal discrimination claim that 
the EEOC and courts developed under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.49  The 
Act is a federal statute that was born out of the civil rights movement and 
prohibits discrimination in a range of areas including employment.50  Title 
VII of the Act prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.51  Under Title 
VII, Congress also established the EEOC, a federal agency authorized to 
issue, amend, and rescind regulations under the Act.52  The EEOC also has 
the authority to enforce these regulations53 and investigate claims.54 
 
 48. See infra Parts I.A–B. 
 49. See infra notes 67–68, 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 50. See The Civil Rights Act of 1964:  A Long Struggle for Freedom, LIBR. OF CONG., 
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/civil-rights-act/epilogue.html [https://perma.cc/VX6E-9XWT] 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 52. See id. § 2000e-12. 
 53. See id. § 2000e-5. 
 54. Anyone who believes they have faced discrimination in the workplace can file a 
charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See id. § 2000e-8; Filing a Charge of Discrimination 
with the EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-
charge-discrimination [https://perma.cc/9BZB-MAFQ] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).  Once the 
employee files the charge, the EEOC notifies the organization and investigates whether there 
is reasonable cause to believe discrimination occurred.  If the EEOC is unable to conclude that 
there is reasonable cause to believe discrimination occurred, it will notify the charging party, 
who then has a right to file a federal lawsuit within ninety days of the notice.  If the EEOC 
determines there is a reasonable chance discrimination occurred, it will invite the parties to 
resolve the charge through mediation or settlement, an informal process called conciliation.  
If conciliation is unsuccessful, the EEOC has the authority to enforce violations of its statutes 
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Although Title VII’s text does not explicitly include the word 
“harassment,” the recognition of workplace harassment claims began in 
Rogers v. EEOC,55 where the Fifth Circuit interpreted § 2000e-2(a)(1) of the 
Act56 to prohibit practices that create a work environment that is “heavily 
charged” with discrimination.57  In Rogers, an employee filed a claim with 
the EEOC against her employers, who owned an optometry business.58  She 
claimed that she suffered discrimination, in part, because her employer had a 
practice of segregating patients.59  The employer argued that this charge 
could not relate to an unlawful employment practice because the 
discrimination was aimed at patients rather than employees.60  Referring to 
the text of § 2000e-2(a)(1) of Title VII,61 the court reasoned that Congress 
intended to define discrimination “in the broadest possible terms.”62  
Furthermore, the court reasoned that employment discrimination had more 
“nuances and subtleties” that could not be “confined to bread and butter 
issues.”63  Thus, the court held that the creation of a work environment 
“heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination” was unlawful.64  The 
court also held that statutory protection against employer abuse and 
workplace discrimination extended to the protection of an employee’s 
psychological as well as economic well-being.65 
At the time of the Rogers decision, the EEOC’s Guidelines on 
Discrimination Because of Sex did not explicitly mention or prohibit 
harassment.66  In 1980, however, the EEOC amended its guidelines to add 
 
by filing a federal lawsuit. See What You Can Expect After a Charge Is Filed, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/what-you-can-expect-after-
charge-filed [https://perma.cc/YLV8-RLKB] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 55. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 56. Section 2000e-2(a)(1) of the Act states:  
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 57. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238. 
 58. See id. at 236. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. at 238. 
 61. See supra note 56. 
 62. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. (stating that § 2000e-2(a)(1) of the Act prohibits the creation of a work 
environment that can “destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of 
minority group workers”). 
 66. At the time of the Rogers decision, the EEOC’s Guidelines on Discrimination Because 
of Sex only contained § 1604.1–1604.10, which set forth several guidelines related to sex 
discrimination including situations when employers could not use sex as a bona fide 
occupational qualification and prohibitions against:  classifying a job as “male” or “female,” 
discrimination against married women, job advertising that indicates a preference based on 
sex, sex discrimination by employment agencies, preemployment inquiries that discriminate 
based on sex, sex discrimination with regard to “fringe benefits,” and discrimination relating 
to pregnancy and childbirth. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 37 Fed. Reg. 
6835, 6836–37 (Apr. 5,1972) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604). 
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29 C.F.R. § 1604.11, Sexual Harassment (“EEOC Harassment Guidelines”), 
a rule specifically prohibiting sexual harassment.67  In its description of the 
rule, the EEOC noted its aim to curtail the continued prevalence of sexual 
harassment and stated that “under Title VII, employees should be afforded a 
working environment free of discriminatory intimidation whether based on 
sex, race, religion, or national origin.”68  Thus, although 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 
is titled “Sexual Harassment,” a footnote states that the principles in the 
EEOC Harassment Guidelines apply to race, color, religion, and national 
origin.69 
The EEOC Harassment Guidelines set out two types of harassment claims.  
Sections 1604.11(a)(1) and 1604.11(a)(2) are the basis for “quid pro quo” 
sexual harassment claims, where unwelcome sexual conduct or favors 
become a condition of employment or are the basis of negative employment 
actions.70  Section 1604.11(a)(3) is the basis for hostile work environment 
harassment claims, where conduct “unreasonably interfer[es] with an 
individual’s work performance or creat[es] an intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive working environment.”71  The EEOC Harassment Guidelines 
further highlight that to determine whether conduct constitutes harassment, 
the EEOC looks at the “totality of the circumstances,” including the “nature” 
of the harassment and “the context in which the alleged incidents 
occurred.”72  Furthermore, the EEOC Harassment Guidelines state that “the 
determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from the 
facts, on a case by case basis.”73 
After the codification of the EEOC Harassment Guidelines, the Supreme 
Court formally recognized harassment claims in Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson.74  In Vinson, an employee sued her employer alleging that her 
supervisor had sexually harassed her over three years of employment.75  The 
employer contended that Title VII claims should apply only where the 
employee has faced tangible or economic losses rather than psychological 
harm.76  Rejecting the employer’s view, the Court first referenced the text of 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and stated that the phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment” demonstrates Congress’s intent to prohibit a broad range of 
discriminatory practices.77  Second, the Court highlighted the EEOC 
 
 67. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2020); Discrimination Because of Sex Under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as Amended; Adoption of Final Interpretive Guidelines, 45 Fed. 
Reg. 74,676–77 (Nov. 10, 1980) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604). 
 68. Discrimination Because of Sex Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
Amended; Adoption of Interim Interpretive Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg., 25,024, 25,024 (Apr. 
11, 1980) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604). 
 69. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 n.1. 
 70. Id. § 1604.11(a). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. § 1604.11(b). 
 73. Id. 
 74. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 75. See id. at 59–60. 
 76. See id. at 64. 
 77. Id. 
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Harassment Guidelines and the specific prohibition on conduct that creates a 
hostile or offensive work environment.78  Thus, the Court held that hostile 
work environment claims are actionable under Title VII79 as long as the 
conduct is severe or pervasive enough to “alter the conditions of employment 
and create an abusive working environment.”80  Furthermore, the Court 
explained that not all conduct that can be classified as harassment rises to the 
level of altering workplace conditions.81  The Court noted that the “mere 
utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings” 
is not severe enough to violate Title VII.82 
After the Vinson decision, the EEOC issued a guidance document entitled, 
“Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment.”83  The 
document, issued on March 19, 1990, does not have the force of law but 
sought to clarify several issues in light of the Vinson decision.84  With respect 
to determining whether a work environment is hostile, the guidance stated 
that the conduct should be evaluated based on an objective reasonable person 
standard.85  Thus, a “petty slight” would not be sufficient, but a single, very 
severe incident of harassment, such as unwelcome touching, might be.86  The 
guidance also reiterated the preventative steps that the EEOC Harassment 
Guidelines encourage employers to take, including implementing explicit 
anti-harassment policies, and highlighted examples of appropriate and 
inappropriate remedial actions by employers in response to harassment 
complaints.87 
The Court revisited and further considered the definition of a hostile work 
environment in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.88  In Harris, the employee 
sued her employer alleging that the company’s president created an abusive 
or hostile work environment by constantly insulting her because of her 
gender and targeting her with sexual innuendos.89  The Court considered 
whether a workplace harassment claim has to involve conduct that seriously 
affects a claimant’s psychological well-being or leads to the suffering of an 
injury.90  The Court held that psychological injury is not required for conduct 
to be actionable and reiterated the “severe or pervasive test” established in 
 
 78. See id. at 65.  The Court acknowledges that the EEOC’s guidelines are not binding on 
courts but that they do constitute a body of experience and judgment that the courts should 
refer to. Id.  For more on the Supreme Court’s deference to the EEOC, see Melissa Hart, 
Skepticism and Expertise:  The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937 
(2006). 
 79. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 73. 
 80. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id. (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
 83. Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, EEOC Notice No. N-915-
050 (Mar. 19, 1990), 1990 WL 1104701 [hereinafter Sexual Harassment Policy Guidance]. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. Id. (quoting Zabkowicz v. W. Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984)). 
 87. See id. 
 88. 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 89. See id. at 19. 
 90. See id. at 20. 
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Vinson.91  To clarify the standard, the Court explained that conduct must be 
both objectively and subjectively hostile.92  To meet the objective prong, the 
conduct has to create a work environment “that a reasonable person would 
find abusive or hostile.”93  To meet the subjective prong, the victim has to 
perceive the environment as abusive.94  Additionally, the Court found that in 
assessing whether an environment is hostile or abusive, a court must consider 
the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency and severity of the 
conduct, whether it was physically threatening and humiliating or a mere 
utterance, whether it unreasonably interfered with the employee’s work 
performance, and whether it affected the employee’s psychological well-
being.95  The Court explained that while each of these factors is relevant, 
none is required.96 
Thus, the hostile work environment doctrine is informed by the EEOC 
Harassment Guidelines, which favor a broad, factual, and contextual analysis 
of harassment claims.97  Additionally, the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
Vinson and Harris favor the prohibition of a broad range of discrimination98 
and the consideration of both objective and subjective factors to determine 
when harassment is severe or pervasive enough to be actionable.99 
B.  Employer Liability for Harassment Claims 
The EEOC Harassment Guidelines also set differing standards for 
employer liability depending on whether or not the harasser is a supervisor.  
Previously, § 1604.11(c) set forth a vicarious liability standard under which 
employers were responsible for the acts of supervisors regardless of whether 
the acts were authorized by or known to the employer.100  Section 1604.11(d) 
sets forth a negligence standard under which employers are responsible for 
the acts of nonsupervisory employees where the employer knew or should 
have known of the conduct and failed to take immediate and appropriate 
corrective action.101 
Section 1604.11(d) is still the operable standard for employee liability for 
the acts of nonsupervisory employees.102  The EEOC, however, rescinded 
§ 1604.11(c) after the Supreme Court decided the 1988 companion cases, 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth103 and Faragher v. City of Boca 
 
 91. See id. at 21–22. 
 92. See id. at 21. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. at 21–22. 
 95. See id. at 22. 
 96. See id. at 23. 
 97. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
 98. See supra notes 77, 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 99. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
 100. See Discrimination Because of Sex Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
as Amended; Adoption of Final Interpretive Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676, 74,677 (Nov. 
10, 1980) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604). 
 101. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (2020). 
 102. Id.; see also Harassment, supra note 46. 
 103. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
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Raton.104  In both cases, the employees claimed their supervisors sexually 
harassed them.105  The Court decided that the EEOC’s vicarious liability 
standard should only apply in instances where a supervisor106 creates a 
hostile work environment that results in a “tangible employment action.”107  
Where the supervisor’s harassment does not result in a tangible employment 
action, the Court established that the employer can raise an affirmative 
defense comprised of two elements:  (1) that the employer exercised 
reasonable care to promptly prevent and correct harassment and (2) that the 
plaintiff-employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive or 
corrective measures offered by the employer.108  The Court reasoned that this 
negligence standard would not only accommodate the agency principles of 
vicarious liability but also encourage employers to establish preventative 
measures and encourage employees to report harassment.109 
Thus, the EEOC and the Supreme Court have framed a liability standard 
under which employers are penalized when they fail to acknowledge 
harassment in the workplace or take steps to prevent or correct it.110  Under 
this standard, employees are also required to utilize the preventative and 
corrective measures established by their employers before their employers 
will be liable for creating a hostile work environment.111 
C.  Tension Between Racial Harassment Claims and Sexual Harassment 
Jurisprudence 
Although the workplace harassment claim originated in Rogers, a case 
involving a racially hostile work environment, harassment jurisprudence and 
legal scholarship have mainly focused on sexual harassment.112  Since its 
codification in the EEOC Harassment Guidelines, racial harassment has been 
under the regulatory cover of sexual harassment.113  Furthermore, the five 
Supreme Court cases through which the hostile work environment 
 
 104. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 105. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747–48; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780. 
 106. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (2013).  In Vance, the Supreme Court 
“reject[ed] the nebulous definition of a ‘supervisor’ advocated in the EEOC Guidance” and 
defined “supervisor” as an employee who is “empowered by the employer to take tangible 
employment actions against the victim.” Id. at 424, 431. 
 107. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (highlighting examples of a tangible employment action 
including discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 
(same); see Harassment, supra note 46 (explaining that an employer is automatically liable 
for harassment by a supervisor that causes an employee to be terminated, not promoted, or to 
lose wages). 
 108. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 109. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 110. See supra notes 101–02, 108 and accompanying text. 
 111. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 112. See Robert T. Carter & Thomas D. Scheuermann, Legal and Policy Standards for 
Addressing Workplace Racism:  Employer Liability and Shared Responsibility for Race-Based 
Traumatic Stress, 12 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1, 23 (2012); Pat K. Chew 
& Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
49, 56–57 (2006). 
 113. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also Carter & Scheuermann, supra note 
112, at 29. 
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jurisprudence developed involved sexual harassment claims.114  Though the 
principles established in each of these cases apply to racial harassment, 
conceptualizing different forms of racial harassment is difficult because there 
is a lack of scholarship discussing racial harassment exclusively.115  
However, on its website, the EEOC broadly defines racial harassment as 
including “racial slurs, offensive or derogatory remarks about a person’s race 
or color, or the display of racially-offensive symbols” and states that “the law 
doesn’t prohibit simple teasing, offhand comments, or isolated incidents that 
are not very serious.”116  Thus, racial harassment claims usually only succeed 
when they involve “overt, repeated and egregious racist/hostile acts.”117 
Professor L. Camille Hébert contextualizes this by arguing that imposing 
strict sexual harassment standards, such as the severe or pervasive standard, 
to racial harassment claims may lead courts to find that serious racially 
discriminatory acts are not actionable.118  She explains that analogizing racial 
harassment and sexual harassment claims may not properly acknowledge the 
differences between them, including differences in historical context and 
how individuals experience each form of harassment.119  Professor Hébert 
posits that analogizing racial and sexual harassment claims is a “two-edged 
sword” because, while it may legitimize sexual harassment claims, it might 
also subvert legitimate racial harassment claims.120 
The harms of hate speech are likely exacerbated by the limited academic 
focus on the effectiveness, or the lack thereof, of racial harassment laws in 
preventing a racially hostile work environment.  If racial harassment claims 
are only successful when offenses are extremely overt, but not when they are 
subtle yet harmful, then the racial harassment jurisprudence fails to achieve 
its purpose of preventing a workplace environment where the conditions of 
 
 114. See Melissa K. Hughes, Note, Through the Looking Glass:  Racial Jokes, Social 
Context, and the Reasonable Person in Hostile Work Environment Analysis, 76 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1437, 1439 (2003); see also, e.g., Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742; Faragher, 524 U.S. 775; Oncale 
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 
17 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 115. See Carter & Scheuermann, supra note 112, at 24; Chew & Kelley, supra note 112, at 
62 (stating that although there is considerable academic discourse about conceptualizing 
sexual harassment, “not one major legal article exists to conceptualize racial harassment as a 
unique social phenomenon and harm deserving its own jurisprudential framework”). 
 116. Race/Color Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/racecolor-discrimination [https://perma.cc/B9BQ-LVAG] (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2021). 
 117. Carter & Scheuermann, supra note 112, at 31. 
 118. See L. Camille Hébert, Analogizing Race and Sex in Workplace Harassment Claims, 
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 819, 878 (1997). 
 119. See id. at 837, 839.  Professor Hébert states that the historical denial of equal rights to 
women has not left the same legacy as “slavery, segregation, and centuries of racial hatred.” 
Id. at 837.  Professor Hébert also notes that, while women have been conditioned to receive 
harassment as “ambiguously motivated,” individuals experience racial harassment as 
“unambiguously hostile.” Id. at 839. 
 120. See id. at 820; see also Pat K. Chew, Freeing Racial Harassment from the Sexual 
Harassment Model, 85 OR. L. REV. 615, 641 (2006) (arguing that “analogizing racial 
harassment to sexual harassment in the absence of further study . . . is problematic”). 
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employment are altered.121  As the next section will demonstrate, the lack of 
federal protections against online hate speech in the United States possibly 
adds to the harms of hate speech as well. 
D.  Efforts to Curtail Online Hate Speech in the United States and Abroad 
In the United States, unlike many other countries, hate speech is 
unregulated.122  The First Amendment generally does not protect speech in 
certain categories, such as incitement to imminent lawless action, fighting 
words, and true threats.123  The Supreme Court has declined the opportunity 
to recognize hate speech as belonging to these categories.  Specifically, the 
Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari in Collin v. Smith,124 where the 
Seventh Circuit held that a local ordinance prohibiting the dissemination of 
materials with hateful content was unconstitutional.125  There, the Village of 
Skokie sought to prevent the Socialist Party of America from having a Nazi 
protest displaying swastikas and disseminating placards with statements such 
as “White Free Speech.”126  The Seventh Circuit held that the village’s local 
ordinance was unconstitutional because it prohibited speech that was not 
lewd and obscene, profane, libelous, or fighting words that would cause 
violence or disorder.127  In other words, the court found that the hateful 
speech did not fall into a class of speech that can be constitutionally 
prevented or punished.128 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that hate speech, 
although it offends, is protected by the First Amendment.129  Commentators 
have posited that the United States’s protection of hate speech coupled with 
 
 121. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 122. See Kevin Boyle, Hate Speech—the United States Versus the Rest of the World?, 53 
ME. L. REV. 487, 499 (2001) (explaining that the United States attached a reservation to Article 
20 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which prohibits 
national, religious, or religious speech that incites discrimination, stating that it would restrict 
free speech protected by the Constitution). 
 123. See Lauren E. Beausoleil, Note, Free, Hateful, and Posted:  Rethinking First 
Amendment Protection of Hate Speech in a Social Media World, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2101, 2104 
(2019); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (stating that the First Amendment 
does not protect “true threats”—that is, statements that communicate a serious intent to 
unlawfully commit violence against a particular individual or group of individuals); 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (holding that advocacy that incites 
imminent lawless action can be proscribed); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 
572 (1942) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect “fighting words” that by 
utterance inflict injury or incite a breach of the peace). 
 124. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (mem.). 
 125. See id. at 1207. 
 126. Id. at 1200. 
 127. See id. at 1204. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding that a Minnesota 
ordinance violated the First Amendment where the ordinance prohibited conduct known to 
cause anger or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender); see 
also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2018) (stating that free speech jurisprudence 
protects the expression of speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, 
age, disability, or any other similar ground). 
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the discretion it grants to social media companies has created a safe haven 
for those who share hate speech online.130 
Social media companies have broad discretion in regulating the conduct 
on their websites due to the Communications Decency Act of 1996.131  The 
Communications Decency Act protects social media companies from 
liability for content that its users share.132  Despite this latitude, however, 
social media companies have established policies around hate speech, in part 
because of the pressure they face from civil rights groups and activists.133  
Facebook’s hate speech policy states that Facebook does not allow hate 
speech because “it creates an environment of intimidation and exclusion,”134 
and its policy continues to expand to include more forms of hate speech.135  
This prohibition also applies to content on Instagram, which Facebook 
owns.136  Twitter prohibits hateful conduct, including the posting of “content 
that intends to dehumanize, degrade, or reinforce negative or harmful 
stereotypes about a protected category.”137  Despite these policies, however, 
hate speech persists.  In the second quarter of 2020, Facebook removed 22.5 
million posts that violated the hate speech policy.138  The number of hateful 
posts on Instagram also quadrupled to 3.3 million in the second quarter of 
2020, from 800,000 in the first quarter.139 
Social media policies and content moderation efforts have garnered much 
backlash, and the regulation of the internet has become a hotly contested 
political debate.  On May 28, 2020, then president Trump signed an executive 
order condemning social media companies for “engaging in selective 
censorship” and “stifl[ing] viewpoints with which they disagree.”140  Since 
then, the CEOs of Facebook, Twitter, and Google have testified before 
 
 130. See Boyle, supra note 122, at 499–500; see also Tsesis, supra note 23, at 859 
(explaining that the United States’s laws make it difficult for other countries to regulate hate 
speech). 
 131. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 
18, and 47 U.S.C.). 
 132. See id. 
 133. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 134. Hate Speech, FACEBOOK CMTY. STANDARDS, https://www.facebook.com/ 
communitystandards/hate_speech [https://perma.cc/UKB3-R3LM] (last visited Jan. 27, 
2021). 
 135. See Oliver Effron, Facebook Will Ban Holocaust Denial Posts Under Hate Speech 
Policy, CNN (Oct. 12, 2020, 2:11 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/12/tech/ 
facebook-holocaust-denial-hate-speech/index.html [https://perma.cc/24EG-4SQU]. 
 136. Community Guidelines, INSTAGRAM, https://www.facebook.com/help/ 
instagram/477434105621119 [https://perma.cc/P8H8-58YR] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 137. Hateful Conduct Policy, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-
policies/hateful-conduct-policy [https://perma.cc/E8TK-SXN3] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 138. Danielle Abril, Hateful Posts on Facebook and Instagram Soar, FORTUNE (Aug. 11, 
2020, 2:11 PM), https://fortune.com/2020/08/11/facebook-instagram-hate-speech-violations-
q2 [https://perma.cc/Q6DJ-5S43]. 
 139. See id. 
 140. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020); see Brian Fung et al., 
Trump Signs Executive Order Targeting Social Media Companies, CNN (May 28, 2020, 9:22 
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/28/politics/trump-twitter-social-media-executive-
order/index.html [https://perma.cc/5HFX-VNPG]. 
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Congress multiple times to address issues, including antitrust,141 censorship, 
misinformation, and hate speech.142  Generally, both Republicans and 
Democrats agree that technology companies should be subject to more 
regulation,143 but they disagree about social media companies’ roles in 
regulating hate speech.  Republicans argue that content moderation is a form 
of selective censorship that has been used disproportionately against 
conservative views.144  Democrats, on the other hand, are concerned about 
whether content moderation efforts can be increased to prevent the spread of 
hate speech and violence.145 
Although the Supreme Court has deemed the regulation of hate speech 
violative of free speech,146 other countries have taken an aggressive approach 
toward hate speech regulation on social media.  On January 1, 2018, 
Germany began enforcing the Network Enforcement Act,147 or NetzDG, a 
hate speech law that penalizes companies such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube with fines of up to sixty million dollars if they fail to remove 
offensive speech within twenty-four hours of receiving a complaint.148  
 
 141. In addition to these congressional hearings, the government has been taking other 
actions suggesting a more hands-on approach to regulating the technology industry.  In 
December 2020, the FTC and forty states sued Facebook alleging that it engaged in 
anticompetitive practices. See Cecilia Kang & Mike Isaac, U.S. and States Say Facebook 
Illegally Crushed Competition, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/12/09/technology/facebook-antitrust-monopoly.html [https:// perma.cc/9JEF-VAEN]; 
see also Rishi Iyengar, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook:  Here’s What You Need to 
Know, CNN (Dec. 11, 2020, 6:27 AM), https:// www.cnn.com/2020/12/11/tech/facebook-
antitrust-lawsuit-what-to-know/index.html [https:// perma.cc/3UCN-PYZ5].  In October 
2020, the U.S. Department of Justice also sued Google for alleged antitrust violations. See 
Cecilia Kang et al., U.S. Accuses Google of Illegally Protecting Monopoly, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/20/technology/google-antitrust.html [https:// 
perma.cc/SVJ6-UKF9]. 
 142. See David Ingram & Ezra Kaplan, Congress Prepares to Grill CEOs of Amazon, 
Apple, Facebook and Google, NBC NEWS (July 28, 2020, 10:15 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/congress-prepares-grill-ceos-amazon-apple-
facebook-google-n1234764 [https://perma.cc/EG4P-897Q]; David McCabe & Cecilia Kang, 
Republicans Blast Social Media C.E.O.s While Democrats Deride Hearing, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/28/technology/senate-tech-hearing-section-
230.html [https://perma.cc/EGV6-LBKM]; Zuckerberg and Dorsey Face Harsh Questioning 
from Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021, 7:11 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
live/2020/11/17/technology/twitter-facebook-hearings [https://perma.cc/5EQT-KZ4J]. 
 143. See McCabe & Kang, supra note 142 (stating that “lawmakers from both parties have 
pushed for new regulations to be applied to the tech companies”). 
 144. At Hearing, Republicans Accuse Zuckerberg and Dorsey of Censorship, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 28, 2020, 6:28 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/10/28/technology/tech-hearing 
[https://perma.cc/BNY9-J87Z]. 
 145. See Zuckerberg and Dorsey Face Harsh Questioning from Lawmakers, supra note 
142. 
 146. See supra note 129. 
 147. Netzdurchsetzunggesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], Sept. 1, 2017, 
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBL] at 3352 (Ger.). 
 148. See Zoey Chong, Germany Kicks Year off with Strict Online Hate Speech Law, CNET 
(Jan. 1, 2018, 10:15 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/german-hate-speech-law-goes-into-
effect-on-1-jan [https://perma.cc/Z529-53BY]; Marrian Zhou, Facebook:  We’ve Removed 
Hundreds of Posts Under German Hate Speech Law, CNET (July 27, 2018, 1:19 PM), 
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Following the murder of a pro-refugee politician in 2019, which the German 
government said was preceded by threats and hate speech online, the German 
government increased regulation by requiring technology platforms to send 
reported content directly to the federal police.149 
India also penalizes online hate speech.  Although the constitution of India 
upholds free speech and expression, the Indian Penal Code punishes any act 
that “incites or promotes disharmony or feeling of enmity or hatred between 
different religious or racial or linguistic or regional groups or castes or 
communities.”150  Recently, Facebook executives in India answered 
questions at a hearing before an Indian parliamentary committee on 
information technology over allegations that they allowed anti-Muslim hate 
speech on the platform and failed to ban anti-Muslim content shared by 
politicians.151 
These laws have sparked an international movement toward more 
regulation of hate speech on social media.152  In September 2020, the Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights announced that 
regional forums would take place in Europe and the Asia-Pacific focused on 
combatting the “rising scapegoating and targeting of minorities on social 
media platforms” and “the growth of hate speech and incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence aimed mainly at minorities.”153 
As concerns about the harms of hate speech spread internationally, 
considerations about employers’ responsibilities to protect against these 
harms may also arise.  Part II considers the differing judicial views and 
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also Intersectional Approach to Hate Speech Against Minorities in Social Media, THE INT’L 
MOVEMENT AGAINST ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION & RACISM (Nov. 20, 2020), 
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II.  CONSIDERING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE WORKPLACE 
The hostile work environment claim developed through cases involving 
harassment that occurred in the brick-and-mortar workplace.154  Courts have 
also considered cases where the incidents of harassment happened outside of 
the work building.  This part presents how courts and scholars have 
responded to cases involving harassment outside of the workplace and on 
social media. 
Part II.A discusses the scholarly debates and differing judicial responses 
to hostile work environment claims involving harassment outside of the 
workplace.  Part II.B describes how courts have responded to claims 
involving social media posts on personal pages that violate employers’ social 
media policies and presents existing opinions about how courts should 
evaluate employer liability for employee misconduct on social media. 
A.  Harassment Outside of the Workplace 
The text and legislative history of Title VII provide little guidance for 
determining the parameters of the workplace.155  Although the bill that would 
become Title VII produced the “longest continuous debate in Senate 
history,”156 the legislative focus was on expanding protections for Black 
Americans and the addition of sex as a protected category.157  Therefore, 
there was no discussion regarding the boundaries of the workplace.158 
The EEOC Harassment Guidelines159 and Policy Guidance on Current 
Issues of Sexual Harassment, last updated in June 1999,160 also do not 
delineate workplace boundaries.  In § 1604.11(d) and (e), the EEOC 
Harassment Guidelines refer to employer liability for acts of sexual 
harassment “in the workplace” but do not define the workplace or its 
parameters.161  The EEOC’s only mention of harassment outside of the 
workplace appears on a FAQ page for the Youth@Work program.162  There, 
the EEOC states that federal law protects people from harassment whether 
the harassment occurs on or off the worksite.163  Despite the EEOC’s 
seeming support for penalizing harassment outside of the workplace, federal 
appellate courts have exhibited differing perspectives on whether conduct 
outside of the workplace is relevant to harassment claims. 
 
 154. See supra Part I.A. 
 155. See Douglas R. Garmager, Note, Discrimination Outside of the Office:  Where to 
Draw the Walls of the Workplace for a “Hostile Work Environment” Claim Under Title VII, 
85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2010). 
 156. Landmark Legislation:  The Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/CivilRightsAct1964.htm 
[https://perma.cc/LT4C-JSKF] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 157. See Garmager, supra note 155, at 1077. 
 158. See id. at 1077–80. 
 159. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2020). 
 160. See Sexual Harassment Policy Guidance, supra note 83. 
 161. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d)–(e). 
 162. See Harassment—FAQs, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc. 
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 163. See id. 
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The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have refused to consider conduct outside of 
the workplace as relevant to workplace harassment claims.  In Sprague v. 
Thorn Americas, Inc.,164 an employee filed a sexual harassment claim against 
her employer alleging that, on five occasions across a sixteen-month period, 
a male coworker made inappropriate comments to her that created a hostile 
work environment.165  Four of the incidents involved verbal statements that 
the male coworker made in the office, but one incident occurred at the 
plaintiff’s wedding reception, where the coworker put his arm around the 
plaintiff and looked down her dress.166  The Tenth Circuit concluded that the 
incident at the plaintiff’s wedding was the most serious but did not consider 
it as a part of the claim because it occurred “at a private club, not in the 
workplace.”167  Thus, the court held that the incidents did not rise to the level 
of creating a hostile work environment.168  In Gowesky v. Singing River 
Hospital Systems,169 the Fifth Circuit considered a disability harassment 
claim in which the employee, a physician, contracted Hepatitis C while 
treating a patient.170  The employee claimed that when she was slated to 
return to work, her employer instituted unreasonable conditions on her return, 
which in part required her to complete refresher courses and submit weekly 
blood samples.171  The employee challenged certain offensive comments that 
her supervisors made to her via telephone and in writing.172  The court held 
that these incidents did not rise to the level of creating a hostile work 
environment and refused to extend the claim “to behavior that occurred when 
[the employee] was not actually working.”173  The court asserted that 
harassment “must affect a person’s working environment.”174 
On the other hand, the First, Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have 
considered conduct outside of the physical workplace as part of hostile work 
environment claims.  In Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc.,175 the employee brought 
a hostile work environment claim against her employer, asserting that she 
was stalked by another employee both inside and outside of the workplace.176  
The employer argued that the district court abused its discretion by 
considering the nonworkplace conduct.177  The First Circuit, however, 
upheld the consideration of the nonworkplace conduct, reasoning that it 
helped to explain why the coworker’s presence in the workplace created a 
 
 164. 129 F.3d 1355 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 165. See id. at 1365. 
 166. See id. at 1366. 
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 176. See id. at 392. 
 177. See id. at 409. 
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hostile environment.178  In Lapka v. Chertoff,179 the plaintiff’s hostile work 
environment claim stemmed from an alleged rape by a coworker that 
occurred in a private hotel room while she was attending a mandatory 
professional training.180  Although the conduct occurred outside of the 
workplace, the court reasoned that it was relevant to the claim because the 
event grew “out of the workplace environment.”181  Additionally, the court 
held that harassment does not have to occur in the physical workplace to be 
actionable; “it need only have consequences in the workplace.”182  In Ferris 
v. Delta Airlines, Inc,183 the plaintiff, a female flight attendant, was sexually 
harassed by a coworker in a hotel room during a layover.184  The Second 
Circuit held that the hotel room was sufficiently connected to the work 
environment to be considered a part of the claim.185 
Similarly, in Moring v. Arkansas Department of Correction,186 the 
plaintiff was sexually harassed by a supervisor in a private hotel room.187  
The Eighth Circuit did not highlight that the incident took place outside of 
the workplace but held that the incident was severe enough to affect the terms 
and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.188  In Dowd v. United 
Steelworkers, Local No. 286,189 a case involving a racial harassment claim, 
the court cited Moring and found that “offensive conduct does not necessarily 
have to transpire at the workplace in order for a juror reasonably to conclude 
that it created a hostile working environment.”190 
This circuit split highlights divergent interpretations of Title VII’s reach.  
While the Fifth and Tenth Circuits maintained narrow views of the 
workplace,191 the Seventh Circuit considered events growing out of or having 
consequences in the workplace.192  Additionally, the Second Circuit 
considered events occurring in locations connected to the workplace,193 and 
the Eighth Circuit considered events severe enough to affect the workplace, 
even when they occurred outside of the workplace.194  This circuit split has 
also produced scholarly debate about whether courts should consider conduct 
outside of the workplace in harassment claims.195 
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Douglas Garmager argues that courts should consider conduct outside of 
the workplace in hostile work environment claims.196  First, Garmager 
acknowledges that under the “modern notions of the workplace,” many 
workplace-related events occur outside of the office.197  He posits that if 
courts adopted a more progressive view, Title VII would provide the 
necessary protections as the concept of the workplace expands.198  Garmager 
then presents the concept of “economic waste”199 and highlights that the 
collateral effects of harassment could negatively affect productivity.200  
Garmager also notes that both Title VII’s text and the EEOC Harassment 
Guidelines are silent regarding harassment and asserts that this silence 
corresponds with the Supreme Court’s expansive view of protections against 
workplace discrimination.201 
Garmager takes his position a step further and argues that employer 
liability should extend to all interactions between employees.202  Parrish v. 
Sollecito203 is central to Garmager’s reasoning.  There, a supervisor sexually 
harassed an employee at an event outside of the workplace.204  In considering 
whether the incident was relevant to the claim, the Southern District of New 
York reasoned that there is no law that “allow[s] a harasser to pick and 
choose the venue for his assaults.”205  The court concluded that sexual 
harassment jurisprudence should not focus on any point in time or 
location.206  Rather, it should focus on the conduct and whether the employer 
has created a “workplace” where offenses occur and “alter the victim’s terms 
and conditions of employment wherever the employment relationship 
reasonably carries.”207  As Garmager highlights, the court also considers that 
when harassment occurs outside of the workplace, the perpetrator can 
“minimize or dismiss” the conduct, while the victim has to deal with its 
consequences.208 
Regarding the practicality of expanding workplace protections, Garmager 
argues that any increased costs to employers would be negligible because 
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employers would just need to update their policies and train and inform their 
employees.209  Garmager also addresses the concern that expansion of the 
workplace harassment claim would cause increased litigation by asserting 
that the Ellerth and Faragher negligence standards would still apply to limit 
employer liability to conduct within an employer’s control.210 
On the other hand, Alisha Patterson argues that the Supreme Court should 
not consider conduct outside of the workplace when evaluating workplace 
harassment claims.211  First, Patterson argues that Title VII’s plain text 
protects an individual’s “privileges of employment” and does not mention 
nonworkplace harassment alongside its use of workplace-related words, like 
“hire” and “employment opportunities.”212  Thus, Patterson argues that the 
plain meaning of Title VII limits protections to conduct in the workplace.213  
Additionally, Patterson argues that the extension of Title VII to 
nonworkplace harassment would be inconsistent with agency principles, 
which “limit[] [the] scope of employment to work period, workplace, and 
work services.”214  Finally, Patterson cautions that “imposing liability for 
non-workplace conduct encourages employers to implement aggressive 
harassment policies that insulate themselves from litigation.”215 
Professor Eugene Volokh has also highlighted concerns regarding free 
speech rights and hostile work environment claims.  Analyzing the balance 
between the government’s interest in curtailing harassment and the 
preservation of free speech rights, Professor Volokh advocates for a directed 
and undirected speech doctrine.216  Professor Volokh defines directed speech 
as speech that is aimed at a particular employee because of the employee’s 
race, sex, religion, or national origin and undirected speech as offensive 
words or conversations that are not directed at an employee but are overheard 
or seen by an employee.217 
Professor Volokh argues that the First Amendment should protect 
undirected harassing speech both inside and outside of the workplace.218  
Regarding undirected harassing speech outside of the workplace, Professor 
Volokh acknowledges that speech outside of the workplace can create a 
hostile work environment claim but asserts that the First Amendment does 
not allow the imposition of liability for speech that is public and political, 
even if it creates a hostile work environment.219  As for harassing speech in 
the workplace, Professor Volokh acknowledges that employers may prohibit 
offensive speech for any reason, including to minimize tension in the 
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workplace.220  He argues, however, that there is a difference between 
employers restricting workplace speech and the government restricting 
workplace speech221 and states that when the government is regulating 
speech, it should err on the side of underregulating to avoid viewpoint 
discrimination.222  Professor Volokh also discusses undirected epithets in the 
workplace and suggests that it is easier to make the case for suppressing 
epithets, which are “more offensive and less valuable.”223  Nevertheless, he 
claims that this line is difficult to draw and that penalizing such speech could 
lead to suppression of political speech, “simply because the majority or the 
elite find it to be offensive.”224  On the other hand, Professor Volokh argues 
that directed harassing speech should not be protected because directed 
insults have little value and an employee should be free from insult.225 
Considering the impact on employment policies, Professor Volokh posits 
that hostile work environment regulation chills individual free speech 
because the employer’s only protection against liability is the creation of zero 
tolerance policies.226  Thus, he suggests, even though one individual’s 
statement might not be severe or pervasive enough, it may be actionable 
when aggregated with other statements, pushing employers to prohibit any 
and all statements that may lead to a hostile work environment.227 
B.  Harassment on the Web and Social Media 
As internet and social media use continue to expand, courts have also 
considered claims of harassment occurring on the web.  One of the first cases 
to consider an employer’s responsibility to prevent workplace harassment on 
the internet was Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc.228  Tammy Blakey, a 
pilot for Continental Airlines, complained of sexual harassment and a hostile 
work environment based on comments directed to her by several male 
employees.229  Between February and July 1995, a number of male pilots 
posted derogatory and insulting comments about Blakey on an online 
computer bulletin board called the Crew Members Forum.230  The question 
before the Supreme Court of New Jersey was whether the employer should 
have a duty to prevent continuing harassment on a bulletin board given that 
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it was not a physical location under the employer’s control.231  The court 
reasoned that, although the electronic bulletin board was located outside of 
the workplace, the employer still had a duty to correct the behavior.232  
Furthermore, the court highlighted that conduct outside of the workplace can 
still permeate the workplace.233  Thus, the court explained that, although 
employers are not required to monitor an employee’s private 
communications, they do have a duty to stop harassment when it occurs in 
settings that are “closely related to . . . and beneficial to [the workplace].”234 
The court advised that, on remand, the trial court should first consider 
whether the employer derived a substantial benefit from the forum.235  The 
court did not specifically define what constitutes a “substantial workplace 
benefit” but indicated relevant factors to consider in determining whether an 
internet platform benefits an employer.236  First, the court mentioned that the 
number of people using the platform was relevant in determining the benefit 
that the employer derives.237  Second, the court noted that the employer might 
have benefited from the employees’ access to the information on the platform 
because it may have improved efficiency and operations.238  The court also 
highlighted that the ability of the employees to communicate with one 
another appeared to be a benefit and stated that, here, the company bulletin 
board was an extension of the workplace.239  The court emphasized, 
however, that employers do not have a duty to monitor the private 
communications of employees.240  Rather, the court stated, employers have 
a duty to stop harassment taking place in settings related to the workplace.241 
Another case involving workplace harassment on social media was Amira-
Jabbar v. Travel Services, Inc.242  Kareemah Amira-Jabbar, a Black female 
employee, brought a workplace harassment claim against her employer.243  
One of the relevant incidents involved a comment that a coworker posted on 
a Facebook photo of Amira-Jabbar at a work-related event.244  Amira-Jabbar 
claimed the comment was racially motivated.245  The employer argued that 
it could not be held responsible for the comment because the account did not 
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belong to the company and the company had no control over it.246  The 
District of Puerto Rico found that the social media comment was sufficiently 
work related to be included in the totality of the circumstances but found that 
it was offhand and not severe or pervasive enough to be actionable in a Title 
VII claim.247  In contrast, the Eastern District of New York, in Fisher v. 
Mermaid Manor Home for Adults, LLC,248 held that a reasonable jury could 
find that a coworker’s post on a personal Instagram account was severe or 
pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment where the employee’s 
coworker shared two photographs of the employee comparing her picture to 
a fictional chimpanzee from the Planet of the Apes movie.249  Specifically, 
the court highlighted that the Instagram post was public and humiliated the 
plaintiff to such an extent that she was found crying on the workplace 
premises.250  Thus, in each of these cases, courts found that the social media 
posts were connected to the workplace when the speech was directed at 
employees. 
Recent court cases have also considered whether offensive social media 
posts on personal pages and not directed at specific employees violated social 
media policies.  In Grutzmacher v. Howard County,251 Kevin Buker sued his 
employer, the county fire department, after he was discharged for violating 
the department’s social media policy, which he alleged was unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment.252  In November 2012, the department had 
issued social media guidelines.253  In addition to prohibiting employees from 
sharing any statements that could be interpreted as undermining the “views 
or positions” of the department, the social media guidelines prohibited 
employees from “posting or publishing statements, opinions or information 
that might reasonably be interpreted as discriminatory, harassing, 
defamatory, racially or ethnically derogatory, or sexually violent when such 
statements . . . may place the Department in disrepute or negatively impact 
the ability of the Department in carrying out its mission.”254  On January 20, 
2013, Buker made a social media post on his personal Facebook page 
criticizing liberal gun control policies.255  The comment stated, “My aide had 
an outstanding idea . . lets all kill someone with a liberal . . . then maybe we 
can get them outlawed too! Think of the satisfaction of beating a liberal to 
death with another liberal . . . its [sic] almost poetic . . . ”256  Shortly after, 
Mark Grutzmacher, a county volunteer paramedic unaffiliated with the 
department, replied to the post with a comment stating, “But. . . . was it an 
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‘assult [sic] liberal’?  Gotta pick a fat one, those are the ‘high capacity’ ones. 
Oh . . . pick a black one, those are more ‘scary’.  Sorry had to perfect on a 
cool idea!”257  Buker liked the comment and replied, “Lmfao! Too cool Mark 
Grutzmacher!”258 
A captain in the department emailed the fire chief with screenshots of the 
posts, and the department moved Buker out of his field operations role to an 
administrative position pending an internal investigation.259  Ultimately, 
Buker’s own posts and his reply to Grutzmacher’s comment were a part of 
the charges presented at a pretermination meeting.260  After that meeting, the 
fire chief terminated Buker’s employment.261 
The Fourth Circuit found that the First Amendment protected the 
conversation overall because the subject matter touched on public 
concerns.262  Considering the racially charged comment, however, the court 
found that the department was reasonably concerned that people could 
interpret Buker’s “like” and positive reply as support for racism or bias.263  
The court also found that Buker’s liking and replying to the comment led to 
the disruption of trust and harmony in the department.264  Thus, the court 
held that the department’s interest in maintaining public trust, promoting an 
efficient workplace, and preventing disruption outweighed the employee’s 
interest in free speech.265 
Similarly, in Sabatini v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department,266 an 
officer sued the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department claiming that the 
department’s social media policy violated his First Amendment rights.267  
The department’s social media policy, which governed the department’s 
official use of social media and employees’ personal use of social media, 
specifically prohibited employees from sharing “speech that ridicules, 
maligns, disparages, or otherwise promotes discrimination against race, 
ethnicity, religion, sex, national origin, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
political affiliation, gender identity and expression.”268  The sheriff fired the 
officer after he made several racially offensive Facebook posts.269  For 
example, the officer shared a post from another Facebook profile that 
displayed a parody of Barack Obama’s campaign image, replacing the words 
“HOPE” with “ROPE” and depicting him with a noose around his neck.270  
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The officer commented, “I guess the emperor thought it was going to be a 
lovefest sprinkled with unicorns and glitter when he opened his POTUS 
twitter account.  Think again.  I don’t see that lasting very long.”271  The 
officer also made several posts about the Black Lives Matter movement and 
referred to its supporters as “ghetto trash race baiting scumbags” who “blame 
their laziness and misfortunes on others” and “[r]ace baiting pieces of shit” 
who should “[b]urn in hell.”272  He also shared two articles about Michael 
Brown, a young Black man who was killed by police officers in Ferguson, 
Missouri.273  One of the articles was entitled, “Michael Brown Memorial—
A Memorial to Why Blacks are Ghetto Dwellers,” to which the officer 
commented “[a]nd there was a video of this piece of shit punching out an old 
man.  Real hero.  Ghetto thug turd.”274 
The District of Nevada found that these posts included content that could 
be protected as a matter of public concern despite the racist connotations but 
ultimately held that the department’s interest in protecting public trust and 
promoting an efficient workplace outweighed the employee’s free speech 
interests.275  Additionally, the court found that the officer’s social media 
posts “violated the social-media policy by promoting discrimination against 
African Americans.”276  The court reaffirmed the framework established in 
Pickering v. Board of Education,277 which states that public employees can 
express themselves as private citizens as long as their speech does not impair 
the employer’s ability to serve the public.278 
Legal commentators have opined about how courts should evaluate 
employer liability for employee misconduct on social media under Title 
VII.279  Jeremy Gelms argues that in determining whether social media 
conduct should be considered in the totality of the circumstances in hostile 
work environment claims, courts should assess whether the employer derived 
a substantial benefit from the online forum.280  Gelms explains that, as noted 
in Blakey, the substantial benefit test allows the courts to determine whether 
the social media was “sufficiently integrated” into the employer’s business 
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and thus an extension of the workplace.281  Gelms presents three arguments 
to support the use of the substantial benefit test.  First, Gelms argues that the 
substantial benefit test is consistent with agency principles that limit 
employer liability to actions that are “aided by the agency relationship.”282  
In other words, liability is consistent with agency principles if, without the 
employment relationship, the conduct could not have occurred.283  Second, 
Gelms argues that the substantial benefit test recognizes the expanding 
concept of the workplace while still excluding conduct that is not an 
extension of the work environment, such as activity on an employee’s 
personal social media page.284  Third, Gelms argues that the substantial 
benefit analysis would guide employers on how to update their anti-
harassment policies to address the use of technological platforms.285  
Professor John Paul sets out the same arguments but further proposes that 
website operators should be liable for harassment in cases where the 
employer is not liable because they have control over the sites and can 
remove offenders.286  The next part proposes that the EEOC should expand 
workplace protections against racist online hate speech. 
III.  THE EEOC SHOULD EXPAND EMPLOYEE PROTECTIONS AS 
WORKPLACE BOUNDARIES EVOLVE 
Given the origins and purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
development of the hostile work environment claim, and the significant 
changes to the workplace, a focus on curtailing the harmful effects of racist 
online hate speech in the workplace is needed.  This part argues that the 
EEOC should expand its guidelines to state that courts should consider racist 
hate speech on social media, including posts on employees’ personal social 
media pages, in hostile work environment claims.  Part III.A demonstrates 
that such an expansion is supported by the plain text of Title VII and the 
EEOC Harassment Guidelines, Supreme Court precedent, and the federal 
government’s recent considerations about curtailing online hate speech.  Part 
III.B expands on the benefits of the suggested change to employees, 
specifically the protection against psychological harm from racist hate 
speech.  Part III.C describes how expanded protections would advance the 
employers’ interests in preventing disruptions in the workplace and curtailing 
reputational harm. 
A.  Consistency with Plain Text, Precedent, and the Movement to Curtail 
Hate Speech 
Expanding federal workplace protections to allow the consideration of 
racist hate speech on social media in harassment claims is consistent with the 
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plain text of Title VII and the EEOC Harassment Guidelines.  As the 
Supreme Court found in Vinson, Congress’s use of the broad terms 
“conditions, or privileges of employment” in Title VII demonstrates that 
Congress intended to prohibit a broad range of discriminatory practices.287  
The EEOC Harassment Guidelines are consistent with this expansive view 
because they broadly penalize conduct that unreasonably interferes with an 
individual’s work performance or creates a hostile or offensive working 
environment.288  Additionally, the EEOC Harassment Guidelines state that 
the EEOC will consider the totality of the circumstances in harassment 
claims.289  Furthermore, as the Fifth Circuit described in Rogers, the first 
case recognizing the hostile work environment claim, courts should consider 
the “nuances and subtleties” of discrimination.290 
There have been several instances in which the Supreme Court has 
expanded the application of Title VII, consistent with this broad reading.291  
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,292 the Supreme Court held that Title VII’s 
prohibitions against discrimination applied to practices that produced a 
disparate impact and not just conduct that resulted in disparate treatment.293  
In Vinson, the Court expanded the doctrine to include practices that create an 
abusive or hostile work environment and that alter the “conditions of 
employment.”294  In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,295 the Court held that 
employment decisions made based on someone’s gender violate Title VII.296  
Most recently, in Bostock v. Clayton County,297 the Supreme Court extended 
Title VII’s protections to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation 
or transgender status.298  This case, resulting in a 6-3 decision, indicates that 
the current Supreme Court might read the Civil Rights Act broadly.  Justice 
Gorsuch, a conservative and textualist, wrote the opinion, holding that 
discrimination based on sex included discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.299  Furthermore, even though Justice Barrett has replaced Justice 
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg,300 a majority of the Court may support a broad reading 
of Title VII consistent with Bostock. 
As several countries301 including the United States recognize and consider 
the need to curtail hate speech on social media, the EEOC should expand its 
regulations to state that racist hate speech on personal social media pages can 
be actionable in hostile work environment claims.  Even though social media 
posts on personal pages may not be connected to the workplace and 
employers may not derive a substantial benefit from an employees’ private 
profiles, racist hate speech shared by an employee can still negatively affect 
the workplace environment by affecting other employees.  This analysis is 
consistent with Crowley,302 Lapka,303 Dowd,304 and Blakey,305 where courts 
found that nonworkplace conduct can still create a hostile work environment 
and that offensive conduct does not need to transpire in the workplace but 
only needs to have consequences in the workplace.  Thus, courts should not 
have to determine whether the employer derives a substantial benefit from 
the online platform.306 
Additionally, in Harris, the Supreme Court stated that courts should 
consider the totality of the circumstances to assess whether an environment 
is hostile or abusive, including whether the conduct unreasonably interferes 
with the employee’s work performance and whether it affects the employee’s 
psychological well-being.307  One significant effect of hate speech is the 
emotional and psychological harm that it can cause employees.308  These 
effects are no different when the content is viewed on a work-related platform 
or a personal social media page.  Therefore, in hostile work environment 
claims, courts should consider the psychological harm that can result from 
viewing a fellow employee’s racist social media post. 
B.  Benefits to Employees and Protection Against Psychological Harm 
Courts should consider racist hate speech on an employee’s personal social 
media page in workplace harassment claims because racist hate speech can 
cause psychological harm and interfere with an employee’s work 
performance.  Racial insults can cause psychological harm, such as 
humiliation, isolation, self-hatred, and physical harm, such as high blood 
pressure.309  In addition to physical and psychological harm, racial insults 
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can severely affect victims’ careers because employees may experience 
issues like defeatism or develop expectations of failure.310  Negative 
psychological impacts stemming from the use of social media itself can 
further compound the harmful effects of hate speech.311  Even racial jokes, 
which many people view as less harmful than other forms of racial 
discrimination, were found by the Ninth Circuit to warrant a valid hostile 
work environment claim in Swinton v. Potomac Corp.312 
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged the harms of hate speech.313  
Specifically, the Court has stated that “a discriminatorily abusive work 
environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees’ 
psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ job 
performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them 
from advancing in their careers.”314  Although posts of racist hate speech on 
personal social media pages may not be directed toward a specific employee, 
like the posts in Grutzmacher315 and Sabatini,316 they can still affect the 
workplace by impacting employees who have viewed the post and have to 
interact with the offending supervisor or employee.  Furthermore, as the court 
asserts in Parrish, while those who share hate speech can minimize their off-
site activities, employees who view the hate speech still have to deal with the 
consequences.317  Thus, courts should consider racist hate speech on personal 
social media pages in the totality of the circumstances. 
In light of the serious psychological and practical harms that racist speech 
can cause, courts should also consider whether racial harassment deserves its 
own legal standard.  The objective prong of the test used in hostile work 
environment claims under Harris is whether a reasonable person would find 
the conduct abusive or hostile.318  Melissa Hughes suggests that the 
reasonable person standard might disadvantage minorities because white 
people may not be aware of how offensive certain comments or behaviors 
are.319  This view is consistent with Professor Hébert’s position that the strict 
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sexual harassment standards, such as the severe and pervasive standard, may 
lead courts to find that serious racially discriminatory acts are not 
actionable.320  As a remedy, Hughes notes that some courts and 
commentators have suggested changing the standard from a reasonable 
person standard to a reasonable minority standard.321  Such a change in the 
legal standard would parallel recent state level changes to the standard for 
sexual harassment322 and resolve some of the tension that Professor Hébert 
highlights regarding the detriment of imposing strict sexual harassment 
standards on legitimate racial harassment claims.323  The next section will 
discuss the benefits that curtailing online hate speech would have for 
employers and how employers’ and employees’ interests can be balanced. 
C.  Benefits to Employers and Combatting Economic and Reputational Risk 
In considering claims involving racist speech on social media, courts have 
analyzed the Pickering factors to balance an employer’s interests against the 
public employee’s free speech interest.324  Courts have held that an 
employer’s interest in these factors may outweigh an employee’s free speech 
interest.  In Bennett v. Metropolitan Government,325 a public employee used 
a racial slur in a discussion about the 2020 presidential election on 
Facebook.326  The Sixth Circuit held that sufficient disruption was found to 
“tip the Pickering balance” toward the employer.327  In describing the 
disruption, the court noted that “employees were upset at work, counselors 
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needed to be involved, and stress levels increased for the agency as a 
whole.”328 
Although Pickering does not apply to private employers, these factors 
equally negatively impact them.  Professors Robert Carter and Thomas 
Scheuermann consider the workplace costs of trauma associated with racism 
and racial discrimination.329  Specifically, employees can experience 
lowered productivity and damage to team efforts.330  Furthermore, racism 
can significantly harm employees’ creativity and communication.331  
Companies that are proactive against racism in the workplace environment 
experience several benefits, including happier employees, increased 
collaboration, more effective workplaces with less stress, and fewer 
harassment and discrimination claims.332 
Although free speech rights are important to democratic values, they are 
not absolute and must be balanced with the constitutional value of equal 
protection.333  Along with increased employer responsibility, however, 
comes the need to balance employer resources and prevent overreaching.  
Overreaching is not a significant concern for three reasons.  First, as 
Garmager argues, the burden on employers will not be increased because, 
under the negligence standards of Ellerth and Faragher, employers will only 
be liable for failing to take proactive measures against hate speech,334 and 
employees would still have to take advantage of the employer’s preventative 
or corrective measures.335  Additionally, the EEOC Harassment Guidelines 
already encourage employers to establish preventative measures against 
harassment.336  Second, to achieve a balance of preserving First Amendment 
interests and prohibiting speech that has little value, employers should only 
be liable for failing to take action against racist hate speech when it has the 
potential to affect an individual’s working environment.  Critical race theorist 
Mari Matsuda sets forth three factors to determine whether speech is harmful 
rather than merely offensive:  (1) whether the message is one of racial 
inferiority; (2) whether the message is directed against a historically 
oppressed group; and (3) whether the message is persecutory, hateful, and 
degrading.337  Employers should apply these factors to complaints to avoid 
overreaching. 
Third, many employers already have antidiscrimination and social media 
policies that permit them to act against speech to prevent economic and 
reputational harm.  To demonstrate that they have taken preventative steps 
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against hate speech on social media, employers should establish clear 
standards in their policies that put employees on notice about the types of 
speech on social media that the employer could penalize.  In addition to 
limiting frivolous complaints using Matsuda’s factors, employers could also 
establish appropriate corrective measures and complaint procedures that 
employees would have to follow when reporting racist social media posts.  
The Supreme Court explained in Ellerth that if the employer has adequate 
complaint procedures, an employee’s failure to use the complaint procedures 
will usually satisfy the employer’s burden in a workplace environment 
claim.338  Thus, employers would only be liable if they fail to implement 
preventative measures, such as updated social media policies, and corrective 
measures, such as reporting procedures.  Preventing economic and 
reputational harm is worth the implementation of these measures to curtail 
employees’ racist online hate speech and ensure that workplace harassment 
does not take a pervasive virtual form. 
CONCLUSION 
The federal government should not ignore the harms of hate speech in the 
workplace.  As harassment jurisprudence continues to expand, the EEOC 
should consider how a politically divided and increasingly virtual work 
environment uniquely affects victims of racial harassment.  Racist hate 
speech can damage an employee’s psychological well-being and have 
adverse effects on work performance both inside of the workplace and over 
the web.  To curtail the harms of racist hate speech in the workplace, the 
EEOC should expand anti-harassment doctrine to state that courts can 
consider racist hate speech on employees’ private social media pages in the 
totality of the circumstances in hostile work environment claims.  This is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s broad reading of Title VII, the global 
push to combat hate speech, society’s interest in preventing psychological 
harm in the workplace, and employers’ interest in maintaining a productive 
and efficient work environment. 
To comply with this expansion, employers should update their social 
media policies to notify employees that harmful and degrading racist hate 
speech on their personal pages may be penalized if viewed and reported by a 
supervisor or coworker.  Updating EEOC regulations to state that courts can 
consider online hate speech in hostile work environment claims reflects a 
commitment to Title VII’s original purpose of preventing discrimination 
even in an ever-evolving modern workplace. 
 
 338. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
